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Brandenburger, Friedenberg, and Keisler provide an epistemic characterization of iterated admis-
sibility (IA), also known as iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies, where uncertainty is
represented using LPSs (lexicographic probability sequences). Their characterization holds in a rich
structure called a complete structure, where all types are possible. In earlier work, we gave a charac-
terization of iterated admissibility using an “all I know” operator, that captures the intuition that “all
the agent knows” is that agents satisfy the appropriate rationality assumptions. That characterization
did not need complete structures and used probability structures, not LPSs. However, that character-
ization did not deal with Samuelson’s conceptual concern regarding IA, namely, that at higher levels,
players do not consider possible strategies that were used to justify their choice of strategy at lower
levels. In this paper, we give a characterization of IA using the all I know operator that does deal
with Samuelson’s concern. However, it uses LPSs. We then show how to modify the characterization
using notions of “approximate belief” and “approximately all I know” so as to deal with Samuelson’s
concern while still working with probability structures.
1 Introduction
A strategy σi for player i is admissible with respect to a set Σ= Σ1×·· ·×Σn of strategy profiles if it is a
best response to some belief of player i that puts positive probability on all the strategy profiles in Σ. That
is, there is some probability µ on Σ−i such that no strategy in Σi gives player i a higher expected utility
than σi with respect to the beliefs µ . As Pearce [18] has shown, a strategy σi for player i is admissible
with respect to Σ iff it is not weakly dominated; that is, there is no strategy σ ′i for player i that gives i at
least as high a payoff as σi no matter what strategy in Σ−i the other players are using, and sometimes gives
i a higher payoff. It seems natural for a rational player not to play an inadmissible strategy. If we delete
all strategy profiles from Σ that involve an inadmissible strategy, we get a new set Σ′ of strategy profiles.
We can then consider which strategies are inadmissible with respect to Σ′, and iterate this process. This
leads to the solution concept of iterated admissibility (IA) (also known as iterated deletion of weakly
dominated strategies), one of the most studied solution concepts in normal-form games.
As Samuelson [20] pointed out, there is a conceptual problem when it comes to dealing with IA. As
he says, “the process appears to initially call for agents to assume that opponents may play any of their
strategies but to subsequently assume that opponents will certainly not play some strategies.” Branden-
burger, Friedenberg, and Keisler [4] (BFK from now on) resolve this paradox by assuming that strategies
are not really eliminated. Rather, they assume that strategies that are weakly dominated occur with in-
finitesimal (but nonzero) probability. Formally, they capture this by using what they call a full-support
LPS—lexicographically ordered probability sequence [2, 3]. Recall that a lexicograpic probability space
is a tuple (Ω,F ,(µ0,µ1, . . . ,µk)), where F is a σ -algebra over Ω and µ0, . . . ,µk are probability distri-
butions on (Ω,F ); ~µ = (µ0, . . . ,µk) is an LPS. Intuitively, the first measure in the sequence ~µ , µ0, is the
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most important one, followed by µ1, µ2, and so on. The full-support requirement says that the union of
the supports of µ0, . . . ,µk is Ω. In this paper, for simplicity, we assume that all sets are measurable and
keep Ω implicit when we speak of an LPS.
BFK define a notion of belief that they call assumption, where an event E is assumed in an LPS
~µ = (µ0, . . . ,µk) if E is infinitely more likely than E under ~µ , and E is infinitely more likely than F for
events E and F if, for all ω ∈ E and ω ′ ∈ F , there is some i such that µi(ω) > 0 and if there exists j
such that µ j(ω ′)> 0, then there exists j′ < j such that µ j′(ω)> 0.1 They then show that strategies that
survive k rounds of iterated deletion are exactly the ones played in states in a complete type structure
where there is a kth-order assumption of rationality; that is, everyone assumes that everyone assumes . . .
(k− 1 times) that everyone is rational. Complete type structures are particularly rich structures, where
all types are possible. By considering LPSs with full support, BFK guarantee that strategies are not
really eliminated; that is, no strategies are ever assigned probability 0. But full support in complete type
structures also forces agents to ascribe positive probability to many other events; in particular, they must
consider possible all beliefs that other agents could have about beliefs that other agents could have . . .
about strategies that an agent is using. The use of complete type structures also leads to other technical
problems. For example, although common assumption of rationality (RCAR) (kth-order assumption
of rationality for all k) is consistent, BFK show that it cannot hold in a complete and continuous type
structure.
There has been a great deal of follow-on work on IA. We briefly discuss some of the results here.
With regard to the latter point, Keisler and Lee [14] show that RCAR is satisfiable in complete (but not
continuous) type structure. In their construction, the structure depends on the game; Lee [15] provides
a general game-independent construction. Yang [22] defines a notion of weak assumption that, as the
name suggests, is weaker than assumption, and shows that common weak assumption of rationality is
satisfiable in continuous type structures. Catonini and de Vito [6] point out that the full-support condition
depends crucially on the topology of the type space; they replace the full-support condition by what they
call cautiousness, which requires only that all strategy profiles are considered possible, and provide a
characterization of IA in complete type spaces using a notion of common cautious belief in rationality.
Finally, Perea [19], using the same notion of cautiousness as Catonini and de Vito, provides a charac-
terization of IA using his version of common assumption of rationality. Perea does not need to consider
complete type spaces; indeed, he shows that his notion of common assumption of rationality is satisfied
even in finite spaces.
In earlier work [11], we provided a characterization of IA using an “all I know” operator. Roughly
speaking, instead of assuming only that agents know (or assume) that all other agents satisfy appropriate
levels of rationality, we assume that “all the agents know” is that the other agents satisfy the appropriate
rationality assumptions. We formalized this notion by requiring that the agent ascribes positive prob-
ability to all formulas of some language L that are consistent with his rationality assumptions. (This
admittedly fuzzy description is made precise in Section 3.) We show that the formula ψLk that, roughly
speaking, says that “all that players know with respect to language L is that all that players know with
respect to L . . . (k times) is that all players are rational” characterizes k levels of iterated deletion of
weakly dominated strategies, both in the case L that just describes the set of possible strategies played
and in the case thatL describes, not only players’ strategies, but also players’ beliefs about what strate-
1This definition of infinitely more likely is due to Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel [2]. BFK give a somewhat general
definition that applies even if not all sets are meaurable. BFK also require that the measures in an LPS have disjoint supports.
While we do not require this, our results would continue to hold with essentially no change in proof if we also imposed this
requirement. We remark that the idea of requiring strategies that survive k+1 rounds of interated deletion to be infinitely more
likely than strategies that survive only k rounds of iterated deletion, used by BFK, goes back to Stahl [21].
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gies other players are using (including higher-order beliefs about other players beliefs). That is, we show
that if the formula ψLk (for these two choices of L ) holds at some state in an arbitrary model, then the
strategies used at that state survive k rounds of iterated deletion. Conversely, if a strategy σ survives
k rounds of iterated deletion, then there is a state in some model M where ψLk holds and strategy σ is
played. If the languageL just talks about strategies, then we can take M to be finite; we do not need to
work with complete type structures to characterize IA. When we consider the language of strategies, “all
I know” can be viewed as roughly analogous to Catonini and de Vito’s [6] notion of cautiousness. On the
other hand, if L talks about strategies and beliefs, then the structures we use are essentially complete
type structures.
The problem with this characterization of IA is that the formula ψLk says that players ascribe positive
probability to all and only the strategies of other players that survive k− 1 rounds of iterated deletion.
Thus, while it does provide an elegant characterization of IA, it does not deal with Samuelson’s concern
that, at higher levels, players do not consider possible strategies that were used to justify their choice of
strategy at lower levels. In this paper we give a characterization using an “all I know” operator in the
spirit of our earlier characterization, but that does enforce a full-support condition, at least for strategies.
To do this, we use a generalized belief operator. Roughly speaking, Bi(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`) says that agent
i believes that ϕ1 is true, but if it not, then ϕ2 is true, and if neither ϕ1 nor ϕ2 is true, then ϕ3 is true,
and so on. Thus, with this generalized belief operator, i describes not only his beliefs, but his “plan of
retreat” in case his beliefs turn out to be false. There is an “all I know” operator that corresponds to this
generalized belief operator in a natural way. The combination of the generalized belief operator and the
corresponding “all I know” operator leads to a characterization of IA with a full-support requirement on
strategies.
In our earlier work, we were able to use standard beliefs and represent uncertainty using standard
probability. However, to give semantics to the generalized belief operator, we need LPSs (we could
equally well use other approaches that can represent infinitesimal probability, like conditional probability
spaces or nonstandard probability spaces. Just as with our earlier work (and unlike BFK), we do not need
to use complete structures; indeed, it suffices to work with finite structures to get our characterization.
Nor do we assume a priori that the LPS is a full-support LPS; the formula that characterizes IA forces
any LPS that satisfies it to be a full-support LPS (at least with respect to strategies).
Although our new approach requires LPSs, it does lead to an arguably more elegant epistemic charac-
terization that more directly deals with Samuelson’s concern (in much the same way that BFK’s approach
does). That said, LPSs require agents to make very fine probability distinctions. In Section 5, we show
how we can modify the new approach using notions of “approximate belief” and “approximately all I
know” so as to deal with Samuelson’s concern while still allowing us to work with probability structures,
rather than LPSs. Roughly speaking, our result says that a strategy for agent i survives k rounds of iter-
ated deletion if it is played at a state where all agent i approximately knows is that all other agents are
k-level rational, but if i were to find out that they are not, then all i approximately knows is that they are
(k−1)-level rational, and so on.
2 Probability Structures, Rationalizability, and Admissibility
The material in this section is taken almost verbatim from our earlier paper [11].
We consider normal-form games with n players. Given a (normal-form) n-player game Γ, let ΣΓi
denote the strategies of player i in Γ, and let uΓi denote the utility function of player i in Γ. We omit the
superscript Γ when it is clear from context or irrelevant. Let~Σ= Σ1×·· ·×Σn. We restrict to finite games,
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so we assume that~Σ is finite. We further assume, without loss of generality (since the game is finite), that
for each player i, the range of ui is [0,1]. LetL 1 be the language where we start with true and the special
primitive proposition RAT i and close off under modal operators Bi and 〈Bi〉, for i= 1, . . . ,n, conjunction,
and negation. We think of Biϕ as saying that, according to player i, ϕ holds with probability 1, and 〈Bi〉ϕ
as saying, accoding to i, that ϕ holds with positive probability. As we shall see, 〈Bi〉 is definable as ¬Bi¬
if we make the appropriate measurability assumptions.
To reason about the game Γ, we consider a class of probability structures corresponding to Γ. A
probability structure M appropriate for Γ is a tuple (Ω,s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn), where Ω is a set of
states; s associates with each state ω ∈ Ω a pure strategy profile s(ω) in the game Γ; F is a σ -algebra
over Ω; and, for each player i, PR i associates with each state ω a probability distribution PR i(ω)
on (Ω,F ). Intuitively, s(ω) is the strategy profile used at state ω andPR i(ω) is player i’s probability
distribution at state ω . As is standard, we require that each player knows his strategy and his beliefs.
Formally, we require that
1. for each strategy σi for player i, [[σi]]M = {ω : si(ω) = σi} ∈F , where si(ω) denotes player i’s
strategy in the strategy profile s(ω);
2. PR i(ω)([[si(ω)]]M) = 1;
3. for each probability measure pi on (Ω,F ) and player i, [[pi, i]]M = {ω :PR i(ω) = pi} ∈F ; and
4. PR i(ω)([[PR i(ω), i]]M) = 1.
The semantics is given as follows:
• (M,ω) |= true (so true is vacuously true).
• (M,ω) |= RAT i if si(ω) is a best response, given player i’s beliefs on the strategies of other players
induced by PR i(ω). That is, i’s expected utility with si(ω) is at least as high as with any other
strategy in Σi, given i’s beliefs. (Because we restrict to appropriate structures, a player’s expected
utility at a state ω is well defined, so we can talk about best responses.)
• (M,ω) |= ¬ϕ if (M,ω) 6|= ϕ .
• (M,ω) |= ϕ ∧ϕ ′ iff (M,ω) |= ϕ and (M,ω) |= ϕ ′.
• (M,ω) |= Biϕ if there exists a set F ∈ F such that F ⊆ [[ϕ]]M and PR i(ω)(F) = 1, where
[[ϕ]]M = {ω : (M,ω) |= ϕ}.
• (M,ω) |= 〈Bi〉ϕ if there exists a set F ∈F such that F ⊆ [[ϕ]]M andPR i(ω)(F)> 0.
We say that ϕ is valid (for game Γ) if (M,ω) |= ϕ for all structures M appropriate for game Γ and all
states ω in M. We say that ϕ is satisfiable (for game Γ) if (M,ω) |= ϕ for some state ω in some structure
M appropriate for Γ.
Note that here we do not assume that [[ϕ]]M is measurable. Thus, we cannot take Biϕ to mean that
agent i ascribes probability 1 to [[ϕ]]M. Rather, we take it to mean that there is a set of probability 1
contained in [[ϕ]]M. Put another way, we are requiring that the inner measure of [[ϕ]]M is 1. Similarly,
〈Bi〉ϕ does not quite say that i ascribes [[ϕ]]M positive probability; rather, it says that the inner measure
of [[ϕ]]M is positive. Given a language (set of formulas) L , M is L -measurable if M is appropriate
(for some game Γ) and [[ϕ]]M ∈F for all formulas ϕ ∈L . It is easy to check that in anL 1-measurable
structure, Biϕ means that i ascribes probability 1 to [[ϕ]]M, 〈Bi〉ϕ means that i ascribes positive probability
to [[ϕ]]M, and 〈Bi〉ϕ is equivalent to ¬Bi¬ϕ .
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Definition 2.1: Strategy σ for player is i weakly dominated by mixed strategy σ ′ with respect to Σ′−i ⊆
Σ−i if ui(σ ′,τ−i)≥ ui(σ ,τ−i) for all τ−i ∈ Σ′−i and ui(σ ′,τ ′−i)> ui(σ ,τ ′−i) for some τ ′−i ∈ Σ′−i.
Strategy σ for player i survives k rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies if, for
each player j, there exists a sequence NWD0j ,NWD
1
j ,NWD
2
j , . . . ,NWD
k
j of sets of strategies for player
j such that NWD0j = Σ j and, if h < k, then NWD
h+1
j consists of the strategies in NWD
h
j not weakly
dominated by any mixed strategy with respect to NWDh− j, and σ ∈ NWDki . Strategy σ for player j
survives iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies if it survives k rounds of iterated deletion of
weakly dominated strategies for all k, that is, if σ ∈ NWD∞j = ∩kNWDkj.
The following well-known result connects weak dominance to best responses.
Proposition 2.2: [18] A strategy σ for player i is not weakly dominated by any mixed strategy with
respect to Σ′−i iff there is a belief µσ of player i whose support is all of Σ′−i such that σ is a best response
with respect to µσ .
3 The Earlier Characterization of IA
In this section, we review our earlier characterization of iterated admissibility, to set the stage for the new
results. Again, the exposition is taken almost verbatim from our earlier paper.
For each player i, define the formulas RATki inductively by taking RAT
0
i to be true and RAT
k+1
i to be
an abbreviation of
RAT i∧Bi(RATk−i),
where RATk−i is an abbreviation of ∧ j 6=iRATkj.2 That is, RATk+1i holds (i.e., player i is (k+ 1)-level
rational) iff player i is playing a best response to his beliefs, and he knows that all players are k-level
rational. Thus, with these definitions, player i is taken to be (k+1)-level rational iff player i is rational
(i.e., playing a best response to his beliefs), and knows that all other player are k-level rational.3 But
what else do players know?
We want to consider a situation where, intuitively, all an agent knows about the other agents is that
they satisfy the appropriate rationality assumptions. More precisely, we modify the formula RATk+1i to
require that not only does player i know that the players are k-level rational, but this is the only thing that
he knows about the other players. That is, we say that agent i is (k+1)-level rational if player i is rational,
he knows that the players are k-level rational, and this is all player i knows about the other players. We
here use the phrase “all agent i knows” in essentially the same sense that it is used by Levesque [16] and
Halpern and Lakemeyer [10], but formalize it a bit differently. Roughly speaking, we interpret “all agent
i knows is ϕ” as meaning that agent i believes ϕ , and considers possible every formula about the other
players that is consistent with ϕ . Thus, what “all I know” means is very sensitive to the choice of the
language. To stress this point, we talk about “all I knows with respect to languageL ”.
To define the “all I know” operator, we use a modal operator ♦ that characterizes consistency, which
is defined as follows:
• (M,ω) |= ♦ϕ iff there is some structure M′ appropriate for Γ and state ω ′ such that (M′,ω ′) |= ϕ .
2We use similar abbreviations in the sequel without comment.
3We should perhaps say “believes” here rather than “knows”, since a player can be mistaken. We are deliberately blurring
the subtle distinctions between “knowledge” and “belief” here.
226 A Conceptually Well-Founded Characterization of Iterated Admissibility
Intuitively, ♦ϕ is true if there is some state and structure where ϕ is true; that is, if ϕ is satisfiable. Note
that if ♦ϕ is true at some state, then it is true at all states in all structures. Define OLi ϕ (read “all agent i
knows with respect to the languageL ”) to be an abbreviation of
Biϕ ∧ (∧ψ∈L (♦(ϕ ∧ψ)⇒ 〈Bi〉ψ)).
In this paper, we focus on just one of the languages considered in our earlier paper, whose formulas
can talk about strategies (but not beliefs) of the players. Define the primitive proposition playi(σ) as
follows:
• (M,ω) |= playi(σ) iff ω ∈ [[σ ]]M.
Let play(~σ) be an abbreviation of∧nj=1 play j(σ j), and let play−i(σ−i) be an abbreviation of∧ j 6=iplay j(σ j).
Intuitively, (M,ω) |= play(~σ) iff s(ω) = σ , and (M,ω) |= play−i(σ−i) if, at ω , the players other than i
are playing strategy profile σ−i. Let L 0(Γ) be the language whose only formulas are (Boolean combi-
nations of) formulas of the form playi(σ), i = 1, . . . ,n, σ ∈ Σi. Let L 0i (Γ) consist of just the formulas
of the form playi(σ), and letL 0−i(Γ) = ∪ j 6=iL 0j (Γ). Again, we omit the parenthetical Γ when it is clear
from context or irrelevant.
The sense in which a player is rational when playing a strategy that survives iterated deletion is
captured by the formulas L 0-RATki , which are defined inductively by taking L
0-RAT0i to be true and
L 0-RATk+1i to be an abbreviation of
RAT i∧Bi(PLAYCONki )∧OL
0
−i
i (L
0-RATk−i),
where PLAYCONki (read “player i plays a strategy consistent with k-level rationality”) is an abbreviation
of ∧σ ′∈Σi(Γ)(playi(σ ′)⇒ ♦(playi(σ ′)∧L 0-RATki )). That is,L 0-RATk+1i holds (i.e., player i is (k+1)-
level rational) iff player i is rational, believes that he is playing a strategy that is consistent with k-level
rationality, knows that other players are k-level rational, and that is all player i knows about the strategies
of the other players.
By expanding the modal operator O, it easily follows thatL 0-RATk+1i implies RAT i∧Bi(L 0-RATk−i).
an easy induction on k then shows that L 0-RATk+1i implies RAT
k+1
i . But L
0-RATk+1i requires more; it
requires player i to assign positive probability to each strategy profile for the other players that is com-
patible with L 0-RATk−i (i.e., with level-k rationality). As shown in our earlier paper [11], the formula
L 0-RATki characterizes strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.
Theorem 3.1: The following are equivalent:
(a) the strategy σ for player i survives k rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in
game Γ;
(b) there exists an L 0-measurable structure Mk appropriate for Γ and a state ωk in Mk such that
si(ωk) = σ and (Mk,ωk) |=L 0-RATki ;
(c) there exists a structure Mk appropriate for Γ and a state ωk in Mk such that si(ωk) = σ and
(Mk,ωk) |=L 0-RATki .
In addition, if ~σ ∈ NWDk, then there is a finite structure M¯k = (Ωk,sk,F k,PRk1, . . . ,PRkn) such that
Ωk = {(k′, i,~σ) : 0 ≤ k′ ≤ k,1 ≤ i ≤ n,~σ ∈ NWDk′}, sk(k′, i,~σ) = ~σ , F k = 2Ωk , and for all states
(k′, i,~σ) ∈Ωk, (M¯k,(k′, i,~σ)) |=L 0-RATk′−i.
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4 The new characterization of IA
In our earlier characterization of IA, in a state where L 0-RATk holds, player i does not consider all
strategies possible, but only the ones consistent with the appropriate level of rationality. That is, because
of the Bi(PLAYCONk−1i ) conjunct in L
0-RATki , player i ascribes positive probability only to strategies
consistent with (k−1)-level rationality. This means that the characterization of the earlier paper does not
address Samuelson’s concern. More specifically, it does not provide an epistemic explanation for why, at
higher levels, players do not consider possible strategies that were used to justify their choice of strategy
at lower levels; it just assumes that they do. We deal with this problem in our new characterization of
IA. The new characterization forces the agent to ascribe positive probability to all strategies, and thus
can be viewed as forcing a full-support requirement, at the level of strategies.
As a first step to getting this characterization, we introduce a notion of generalized belief, which may
be of independent interest. Specifically, we consider formulas of the form Bi(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`). As we said in
the introduction, this formula can be read “agent i believes that ϕ1 is true, but if it not, then ϕ2 is true,
and if neither ϕ1 nor ϕ2 is true, then ϕ3 is true, . . . , and if none of ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`−1 is true, then ϕ` is true. We
give semantics to such formulas in an LPS ~µ = (µ0, . . . ,µk).4
To give semantics to generalized belief, we use LPS structures, that is, structures of the form M =
(Ω,s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn), where nowPR i associates with each state an LPS. To define the semantics
of the generalized belief operator, we need to recall the definition of conditioning in LPSs [2]. For
simplicity, we restrict our attention to structures M where Ω is finite andF consists of all the subsets of
Ω; that is, every set is measurable; we refer to such structures as fully measurable. Given a measurable
set U and ~µ = (µ0, . . . ,µk), define
~µ|U = (µk0(· |U),µk1(· |U), . . .),
where (k0,k1, . . .) is the subsequence of all indices for which the probability of U is positive. Formally,
k0 =min{k : µk(U)> 0} and, if µkh has been defined and there exists an index h′ such that kh < h′≤ k and
µh′(U)> 0, then kh+1 =min{h′ : µh′(U)> 0, kh < h′ ≤ k}. Note that ~µ|U is undefined if ~µ(U) =~0 (i.e.,
µ j(U) = 0 for j = 0, . . . ,k) and that the length of the sequence ~µ|U depends on U . If (~µ|U) = (µk0 , . . .),
then we write~µ(V |U)0 to denote µk0(V |U), the conditional probability according to the first probability
measure in the LPS ~µ|U .
If M = (Ω,s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn) andPR i(ω) =~µ = (µ0, . . . ,µk), then
(M,ω) |= Bi(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`) if ~µ(¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕ`−1) 6=~0, µ0([[ϕ1]]M) = 1, (~µ([[ϕ2]]M | [[¬ϕ1]]M)0 = 1,
. . . , (~µ([[ϕ`]]M | [[¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕ`−1]]M)0 = 1.
That is, ϕ1 gets probability 1 at the top level, ϕ2 get probability 1 at the top level conditional on ϕ1 being
false, and so on. (The first requirement, that ~µ(¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕ`−1) 6=~0, ensures that all the conditional
probabilities are well defined.)
There is also a corresponding “all I know” operator, OLi (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`), which again is taken with
4There is nothing special about the use of LPSs here. Battigalli and Sinischalchi use conditional probability systems to
define their notion of strong belief, and we could equally well use conditional probability systems here. We could also easily
use nonstandard probability measures. Readers familiar with these representations of uncertainty (see [9] for an overview)
should have no difficulty giving analogues of our semantic definitions using these alternative approaches.
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respect to a languageL , defined as follows:
(M,ω) |= OLi (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`) if (M,ω) |= Bi(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`) and,
for all ψ ∈L , if (M,ω) |= ♦(ϕ1∧ψ) then µ0([[ψ]]M) 6=~0 and,
for all h with 2≤ h≤ `, if (M,ω) |= ♦(¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕh−1∧ϕh∧ψ)
then (~µ([[ψ]]M | [[¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕh−1]]M)0 6=~0.
It is easy to see that the new definition OLi (ϕ1) is identical to the earlier definition. The generalized
version OLi (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk) requires all formulas ψ consistent with ϕ to have positive probability at the top
level and, in addition, for h≥ 2, all formulas ψ consistent with ¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕh−1∧ϕh must have positive
probability at the top level conditional on ¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕh−1.
Before going on, we briefly review how best response is defined in LPS structures. Since player i’s
beliefs at a state ω are defined by an LPS (µ0, . . . ,µk), we take the expected utility associated with i’s
strategy si(ω) at ω to be a tuple (u0, . . . ,uk), where u j is the expected utility of si(ω) with respect to
probability µ j. We can then compare two expected utilities lexicographically: (u0, . . . ,uk)> (u′0, . . . ,u′k)
if there exists a j ≤ k such that u0 = u′0, . . . , u j−1 = u′j−1, and u j > u′j. With this definition, we can still
take RAT i to hold at ω if si(ω) is a best response, given i’s about the strategies of other players at ω .
We can now define the formulas GRATki (the G stands for “generalized”) inductively by taking
GRAT0i to be true and GRAT
k+1
i to be an abbreviation of
RAT i∧OL
0
−i
i (GRAT
k
−i, . . . ,GRAT
0
−i).
That is, all agent i knows is that the other agents are k-level rational, but if they are not, then are (k−1)-
level rational, and if they are not, they are (k−2)-level rational, and so on.
Theorem 4.1: The following are equivalent:
(a) the strategy σ for player i survives k rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in
Γ;
(b) there exists a fully measurable LPS structure Mk appropriate for Γ and a state ωk in Mk such that
si(ωk) = σ and (Mk,ωk) |= GRATki .5
In addition, if~σ ∈NWDk, then there is a fully measurable LPS structure M¯k =(Ωk,s,F ,PRk1, . . . ,PRkn)
such thatΩk = {(k′, i,~σ) : 0≤ k′≤ k,1≤ i≤ n,~σ ∈NWDk′}, sk(k′, i,~σ) =~σ ,F k = 2Ωk , and for all states
(k′, i,~σ) ∈Ωk, (M¯k,(k′, i,~σ)) |= GRATk′−i.
The proof of this and other results can be found in the full paper. However, we mention here one of the
key propositions used in proving the theorem, since it also gives some intuition for the GRAT j operator
and will allow us to compare our results to those of others. Suppose that M is a model appropriate for a
game Γ, (M,ω) |= GRATk+1i , and PR i(ω) = ~µ . Part (a) of the proposition says that player i satisfies
cautiousness under ~µ in the sense of Catonini and de Vito [6] and Perea [19]: for all strategy profiles
~τ−i ∈ Σ−i, we have ~µ([[play(τ−i)]]M) 6=~0. Part (b) says that, if there are at least two players not all
of whose strategies survive iterated deletion, then the formulas GRAThi for h = 1,2,3, . . ., are mutually
exclusive. Part (c) says that for all h ≤ k, strategy profiles compatible with GRATh−i are infinitely more
likely those not compatible with GRATh−i ∨ . . .∨GRATk−i under ~µ . But our sense of “infinitely more
likely than” is weaker than that of Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel [2], and closer in spirit to that of
Lo [17]. Formally, we use the notion of domination, where event E µ-dominates F , written E ~µ F , if
min{` : µ`(E)> 0}< min{` : µ`(F)> 0} (where we take min( /0) = ∞).
5It follows from the proof that we can take all the LPSs in Mk to have length k+1.
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Proposition 4.2: Suppose that M is an appropriate model for game Γ, (M,ω) |=GRATk+1i , andPR i(ω)=
~µ = (µ0, . . . ,µm).
(a) For all strategy profiles~τ−i ∈ Σ−i, we have ~µ([[play(τ−i)]]M) 6=~0.
(b) If NWD1j 6= NWD0j for at least two players j, then (M,ω) |= ¬GRAT1i ∧ . . .∧¬GRATki .
(c) If h < h′ ≤ k, then [[Hh′−i]]M µ [[Hh−i]]M, where Hk
′
−i is an abbreviation of the formula GRAT
k′
−i ∧
¬GRATk′+1−i ∧ . . .∧¬GRATk−i (so Hk−i is GRATk−i). Moreover, for all h≤ k and strategy profiles~τ−i
and ~τ ′−i, if [[GRAT
h
−i ∧ play(~τ−i)]]M 6= /0, and [[(GRATh−i ∨ . . .∨GRATk−i)∧ play(~τ ′−i)]]M = /0, then
[[play(~τ−i)]]M ~µ [[play(~τ ′−i)]]M.
It follows from part (b) that if some strategies of at least two players are weakly dominated, then
the analogue of common assumption of rationality cannot hold. There is no state where GRATki holds
for all k; indeed, there is not even a state where GRATki holds for all sufficiently large k. (The same
comment applies to the L 0-RATki operators used in Theorem 3.1.) By way of contrast, Catonini and de
Vito [6] and Perea [19] show that their variants of common assumption do hold, while for BFK, k-level
assumption for all k larger that some k∗ holds (but which k∗ it is depends on the game Γ). Unlike Catonini
and DeVito and BFK, but like Perea, we are able to characterize IA using only finite structures. Perhaps
the biggest difference between Perea’s characterization and ours is that we have different notions of
caution. For Perea’s notion of (k+1)-fold assumption of rationality to hold for player i at a state ω , each
strategy profile~τ−i compatible with a k-fold assumption of rationality must get positive probability (i.e.,
if Pri(ω) =~µ = (µ0, . . . ,µm), then µh(~τ−i)>~0 for some h). On the other hand, if GRATk+1i holds at ω ,
then for each strategy profile~τ−i compatible with GRATk−i we have µ0(~τ−i)> 0. The fact that we require
µ0(~τ−i) > 0 rather than just µh(~τ−i) > 0 for some h will play an important role in the characterization
of IA given in the next section that uses only standard probability. Perea’s approach does not lead to an
obvious analogue of that result.
5 Using approximate belief and probability structures
While the approach described in Section 4 deals with Samuelson’s concern, it does so by assuming that
the agents’ beliefs are characterized by LPSs. Our earlier approach characterized IA using (standard)
probability structures, but did not deal with Samuelson’s concerns. We now show that we can character-
ize IA using standard probability structures, while still dealing with Samuelson’s concern, by considering
approximate belief in an appropriate sense.
We start with a quantitative analogues of the belief operators Bi,〈Bi〉 and also define a conditional
belief operators. Just as we did in the previous section, for simplicity, we restrict our attention to fully
measurable structures. If M = (Ω,s,F ,PR1, . . . ,PRn) is a fully measurable probability structure,
then
• (M,ω) |= Bδi ϕ ifPR i(ω)([[ϕ]]M)≥ 1−δ , and (M,ω) |= 〈Bi〉δϕ ifPR i(ω)([[ϕ]]M)≥ δ ,
• (M,ω) |=Bδi (ϕ | θ) ifPR i(ω)([[θ ]]M)> 0 andPR i(ω)([[ϕ]]M | [[θ ]]M)≥ 1−δ , and analogously
for 〈Bi〉δ (ϕ | θ).
That is, Bδi ϕ means that player i is “almost certain” that ϕ holds—i assigns probability at least 1−δ to
ϕ holding—and Bδi (ϕ | θ) means that if i learns that θ holds, then i is almost certain that ϕ holds.
The analogous “all I approximately know” operator, O(L ,δ ,ε)i , takes two parameters, δ and ε . As
with the approximate belief operator Bδi , the δ tells us how close to 1 agent i’s beliefs have to be. The ε
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gives us a lower bound on how likely each formula inL consistent with what is believed must be. Again,
we also consider a conditional version of the operator. Define OL ,ν ,εi ϕ (read “all agent i approximately
knows with respect toL is ϕ”) to be an abbreviation for
Bδi (ϕ)∧ (∧ψ∈L (♦(ϕ ∧ψ)⇒ 〈Bi〉ε(ψ))).
and define OL ,δ ,εi (ϕ | θ) (read “if agent i were to find out that θ holds, then all agent i approximately
knows with respect toL is ϕ”) to be an abbreviation for
Bδi (ϕ | θ)∧ (∧ψ∈L (♦(ϕ ∧ψ ∧θ)⇒ 〈Bi〉ε(ψ | θ))).
Finally, let OL ,ν ,εi (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`) be an abbreviation for
OL ,δ ,εi (ϕ1)∧OL ,δ ,εi (ϕ2 | ¬ϕ1)∧ . . .∧OL ,δ ,εi (ϕ` | ¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕ`−1).
To relate this definition to the definition in LPS structures, let Bδi (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`) be an abbreviation for
Bδi (ϕ1)∧Bδi (ϕ2 | ¬ϕ1)∧ . . .∧Bδi (ϕ` | ¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕ`−1).
Note that
(M,ω) |= OL ,δ ,εi (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`) iff (M,ω) |= Bδi (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`) and,
for all ψ ∈L , if (M,ω) |= ♦(ϕ1∧ψ) then µ([[ψ | ϕ1]]M)> ε and,
for all h with 2≤ h≤ `, if (M,ω) |= ♦(¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕh−1∧ϕh∧ψ)
then (µ([[ψ]]M | [[¬ϕ1∧ . . .∧¬ϕh−1]]M)0 > ε.
Thus, OL ,δ ,εi (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`) really is the “approximate” analogue of O
L
i (ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ`). We now define the
formulas GRATk,δ ,εi in exactly the same way as GRAT
k except that we replace the LPS-based OLi op-
erator with OL ,δ ,εi . In more detail, define GRAT
0,δ ,ε
i to be true, and GRAT
k,δ ,ε
i to be an abbreviation
of
RAT i∧OL
0
−i,δ ,ε
i (GRAT
k,δ ,ε
−i , . . . ,GRAT
0,δ ,ε
−i ).
That is, all agent i approximately knows is that all other agents are k-level rational, but if i were to find
out that they are not, then all i approximately knows is that they are (k−1)-level rational and so on.
Theorem 5.1: For all finite games Γ and all sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists some δ > 0 such that
the following are equivalent:
(a) the strategy σ for player i survives k rounds of iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in
Γ;
(b) there exists a fully measurable structure Mk appropriate for Γ and a state ωk in Mk such that
si(ωk) = σ and (Mk,ωk) |= GRATk,δ ,εi .
In addition, if ~σ ∈ NWDk, then for all sufficiently small ε > 0, there exists some δ > 0 and a fully
measurable structure M¯k,δ = (Ωk,δ ,sk,δ ,F k,δ ,PRk,δ1 , . . . ,PR
k,δ
n ) such that Ωk,δ = {(k′, i,~σ) : 0≤ k′≤
k,1 ≤ i ≤ n,~σ ∈ NWDk′}, sk,δ (k′, i,~σ) = ~σ , F k,δ = 2Ωk , and for all states (k′, i,~σ) ∈ Ωk,δ , we have
(M¯k,δ ,(k′, i,~σ)) |= GRATk′,δ ,ε−i .6
6How small ε has to be depends only on the game. Although the choice of δ depends on the choice of ε , ε plays no role in
the construction of M¯k,δ (which is why we did not write M¯k,δ ,ε ).
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6 Discussion
We have used the “all I know” operator introduced in our earlier paper to provide an epistemic charac-
terization of IA that deals with Samuelson’s conceptual concerns. We actually provided two character-
izations, one in LPS structures and one in probability structures. The former uses a generalized belief
operator, while the latter uses a generalized approximate belief operator. These operators may be of in-
dependent interest. For example, a logic with a generalized belief operator may be an appropriate logic
in which to describe belief revision [1, 13] and iterated belief revision [7], since it allows us to describe
how beliefs would be revised. It clearly has deep connections with counterfactual reasoning as well. For
example, in a logic of counterfactuals, a formula such as Bi(ϕ1,ϕ2) can be viewed as an abbreviation
of Bi(ϕ1)∧ (¬Bi(ϕ1)→i Bi(ϕ2)), where→i is a counterfactual operator (see [8] for a discussion of and
semantics for this standard operator); the formula Bi(ϕ1, . . . ,ϕk) can be expressed using counterfactuals
in a similar way. It would of interest to axiomatize the logic of generalized belief.
The more quantitative operator Bδi may also be of independent interest. Interestingly, in cognitive
hierarchy theory (CHT) [5], there are assumed to be different types of players: roughly speaking, level-k
players are assumed to be k-level rational, and players assign probabilities to a player being of level-
k. Whereas in our characterization of IA, level-k players are assigned the highest probability, followed
by level-k− 1, and so on, in CHT it is the other way around. In any case, having an operator like Bδi
may allow a more realistic characterization of players beliefs than a purely qualitative generalized belief
operator.
Finally, while we have focused here only on IA, in other work [12], we have also used the notion of
all I know to characterize Pearce’s notion of extensive-form rationalizability [18], a well-studied solution
concept in extensive-form games that also involves iterated deletion. That characterization too used a
variant of the PLAYCONi formula, and thus does not address Samuelson’s concerns. Although we have
not yet checked details, it seems that we should also be able to get a characterization of extensive-form
rationalizability using the techniques of this paper. All this suggests that thinking in terms of an “all I
know” operator and generalized belief may provide further insights into solution concepts.
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